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PreFace
Public Finance in Post-conFlict 
environments: a Policy PaPer series
In the wake of violent conflict, a key element of building 
a durable peace is building a state with the ability to 
collect and manage public resources. To implement 
peace accords and to provide public services, the 
government must be able to collect revenue, allocate 
resources, and manage expenditure in a manner that is 
regarded by its citizens as effective and equitable. 
The tasks of revenue mobilization, budget allocation, 
and expenditure management are bound together 
by political imperatives as well as economic logic. To 
collect revenues, the state must be seen as legitimate 
in the eyes of its citizens. and to secure legitimacy, the 
state must allocate resources and manage expenditure 
effectively and equitably. 
The need to build legitimate and capable states in war-
torn societies is now widely recognized. The Principles 
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, 
adopted by the development ministers of major donor 
countries in march 2005, declares that statebuilding is 
‘the central objective.’ This represents a striking break 
from the prevailing wisdom in the closing decades of 
the 20th century, when the state was widely regarded as 
the problem. The state has been rediscovered: it is now 
invoked as the solution. The policy rhetoric has changed 
from downsizing states to building state capacity. 
Yet little systematic work has been done on what 
the international community can and should do to 
strengthen the capacities of post-war states to mobilize, 
allocate, and spend public resources.  
This policy paper series, jointly published by the 
Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at new York 
University and the political economy research Institute 
(perI) at the University of massachusetts,  amherst, 
seeks to redress this gap by presenting innovative 
policy proposals targeting critical issues in postwar 
public finance. 
Building state capacities in public finance is crucial to 
the success of peacebuilding efforts for three reasons: 
First, governments must be able to ensure  »
sustainable funding for new democratic 
institutions, for social programs that ease tensions 
and redress grievances, and for public investments 
to promote economic growth and development. In 
the early post-war years, countries often receive a 
large influx of external assistance that temporarily 
can meet some of these needs. But aid typically 
diminishes over time, so domestic resources 
are necessary to sustain these institutions and 
programs. a key challenge is to ensure that aid 
does not ‘crowd out’ domestic fiscal capacities, but 
instead stimulates their growth.
second, fiscal capacities are needed to build a  »
legitimate state. Democratic elections do not, in 
and of themselves, ensure state legitimacy. neither 
do ‘quick impact projects’ in which international 
aid agencies seek to fill urgent needs. legitimacy 
comes in large part from government delivery of 
services that people need and want. elections 
provide an avenue for the citizenry to voice 
demands; responding to those demands requires 
the capacity to mobilize, allocate, and spend public 
resources effectively.
Third, in some cases there is a need to curtail extra- »
legal taxation by ‘warlords’ and armed groups so as 
to enhance security. In afghanistan, for example, 
control of border customs outposts is not only a 
fiscal issue but also a security issue. similarly, control 
over revenues from natural-resource extraction, 
such as logging in Cambodia or diamonds in West 
africa, is often crucial for establishing the state’s 
monopoly not only in legitimate taxation but also 
in legitimate force. at the same time, domestic fiscal 
capacity is the only sustainable source of financing 
for public security after external peacekeepers 
have withdrawn.
The papers in this series offer policy proposals designed 
to strengthen the fiscal dimension of statebuilding. 
The authors draw on extensive personal experience 
in public finance matters in war-torn societies, and 
on lessons from comparative studies, including Peace 
and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar 
Statebuilding (Boulder: lynne rienner, 2007), the 
outcome of the first stage of the CIC’s statebuilding 
project.  after a concise recapitulation of the problems 
to be addressed, the authors concentrate on proposing 
solutions that can be practically implemented. 
We hope these policy papers will find a wide audience 
amongst those who are grappling with the difficult 
challenges of post-war reconstruction, and that the 
proposals they put forward will assist in the twin tasks 
of building legitimate and effective states and building 
a durable peace. 
James K. BoYCe 
Lead economist, Peacebuilding as Statebuilding Program
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Promoting grouP 
Justice: Fiscal Policies 
in Post-conFlict 
countries 
eXecutive summary
evidence suggests that economic inequalities – 
particularly “horizontal inequalities” among groups 
defined by ethnic, racial, linguistic, regional, and 
religious lines – can generate social tensions and 
fuel violent conflict. Well-designed fiscal policies 
can help build a sustainable peace by working to 
reduce these inequalities. This paper reviews some 
challenges raised by analyzing the impacts of tax 
and expenditure policies on inequality in post-
conflict settings, and makes recommendations 
for incorporating distributional effects into fiscal 
policy making.
the challenge oF measurement
The first step in understanding the status and 
dynamics of horizontal inequalities (hIs) is to 
map the group boundaries that form the basis 
for discrimination or favoritism. a careful scoping 
exercise is needed to answer four key questions:
(1) are the salient groups ranked hierarchically?
(2) are they geographically concentrated, or 
     dispersed?
(3) are they specialized in certain economic 
     sectors or activities?
(4) Does the government have the political 
      inclination to tackle inequalities? 
after the relevant groups are defined, both income 
and non-income dimensions of hI should be 
measured. The latter include ownership of land 
and other assets, employment, education, and 
infant and child mortality. simple comparisons 
of averages – such as per capita income – can 
conceal distributional differences within groups, 
so comparisons at various points across the 
distribution are also needed. 
This paper proposes three approaches to tackle 
these measurement challenges:
Where data needed to measure horizontal in- »
equalities are not available (or highly inade-
quate), small-scale household surveys should be 
conducted to assess inter-group disparities in (a) 
asset ownership; (b) employment; (c) incomes; 
(d) education; and (e) health and nutrition.
Where conflict-relevant group boundaries are  »
not evident, perceptions surveys should be 
conducted on attitudes toward identities and 
inequalities. 
In addition to regional and linguistic  »
categorizations, statistical offices should be 
encouraged to include ethnic, religious, or 
racial categorization (if  relevant and politically 
feasible) in subsequent data collection.
taXation Policies
Tax policies in post-conflict settings can and 
should aim not only to mobilize revenue but also 
to address inequality. These aims are interrelated 
as perceptions of tax-policy inequity can 
undermine the legitimacy of the taxation 
system and deter compliance, impeding revenue 
collection. addressing distributional issues by 
making tax liability directly dependent on religious, 
ethnic, or racial identity, risks strengthening group 
divisions. policies can be devised, however, to 
increase progressivity and tax more heavily those 
groups that are relatively privileged. To this end, the 
paper recommends that policy makers:
Increase the general progressivity of  the  »
tax system by (a) increasing the role and 
progressivity of  direct taxes and property taxes, 
and (b) increasing the progressivity of  indirect 
taxes by raising rates on luxuries and exempting 
basic goods consumed by the poor.
Design indirect taxes to bear more heavily  »
on privileged groups, by introducing taxes 
or increasing rates on geographic areas and 
production and consumption activities in which 
such groups are concentrated.
Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments
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eXPenditure Policies
expenditure policies also can be designed to 
redress hIs. people benefit from public expenditure 
in the allocation of contracts and employment, as 
well as in their access to public services.  
Four relevant types of expenditure can be 
distinguished:
(1) expenditures with differentiated effects   
 on both inter-regional and intra-regional  
 lines, such as expenditure on infrastructure.
(2) expenditures with differentiated 
 benefits across groups but not necessarily  
 across regions, such as airline subsidies.
(3) expenditures with differentiated   
 benefits across regions but not  
 necessarily within regions, such as  
 expenditure on environmental quality.
(4) Transfer payments to specific   
 communities, households, or individuals.
To improve the distributional impacts of public 
expenditures, the paper offers the following 
recommendations:
In the construction of  facilities and delivery  »
of  services, allocation of  contracts and 
employment should explicitly consider 
fairness among groups. Potential policies 
to promote this include competitive and 
transparent bidding procedures for contracts; 
“fair” employment legislation and rules; and 
technical assistance and possibly quotas to 
ensure equitable distribution.
The distributional impacts of  public services  »
should be monitored, and allocations made 
to ensure greater horizontal and vertical 
equity by targeting pro-poor sectors, activities 
within sectors, and locations. In federal 
or decentralized systems, revenue-sharing 
formulae should be designed to improve 
regional equity. Aid allocation should follow 
similar principles. 
Aid donors should assist governments to  »
identify types of  expenditure that will reduce 
inequalities, drawing on available data, light 
surveys, and evidence from other countries. 
Where capacity is a constraint, they should 
provide technical assistance to integrate 
distributional impacts into public expenditure 
reviews and planning. Where willingness to 
tackle inequalities is a constraint, they should 
undertake policy dialogue and conditionality, 
and direct their own resources to improving 
horizontal and vertical equity.
conclusion
The need to tackle horizontal inequality in post-
conflict policies is increasingly recognized. 
Innovative policies can address this need. 
Collecting data on inequalities will enable policy 
makers to analyze the distributive impacts of the 
fiscal system, and to devise tax and expenditure 
polices to redress these biases.  aid donors have an 
important role to play in ensuring a government’s 
success in these efforts.  
Public Finance in Post-Conflict / A Policy Paper Series /
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Promoting grouP 
Justice: Fiscal Policies 
in Post-conFlict 
countries 
by Frances stewart, graham 
brown, and aleX cobham1 
This paper reviews the impact of fiscal policies 
on inequality in post-conflict settings, and offers 
proposals to integrate distributional concerns 
better into policy making. We first review the 
relationship of inequality to conflict, focusing on 
the importance of “horizontal inequalities” across 
groups that are culturally defined on the basis of 
ethnicity, religion, race, or other attributes. after 
considering how groups should be selected for 
assessing horizontal inequalities, we examine 
measurement and data issues. We then discuss 
how tax and expenditure policies can contribute 
to the goal of building a durable peace by helping 
to reduce distributional inequalities. 
inequality and conFlict
While it seems plausible that high levels of 
inequality generate resentment and fuel conflict, 
the evidence on whether higher “vertical 
inequality” between rich and poor in the society 
as a whole increases the risk of violent intra-state 
conflict is inconclusive.2 more evidence supports 
the view that horizontal inequalities (hIs) are 
often a source of violent conflict (stewart 2000; 
mancini 2005; Østby 2006). Intergroup inequalities 
generate powerful grievances that leaders can 
1 Frances stewart is the director of the Centre for research on Inequality, 
human security, and ethnicity (CrIse) and professor of development 
economics at the Department of International Development, University 
of oxford. Graham Brown is research officer for southeast asia at CrIse, 
University of oxford. alex Cobham is supernumerary fellow in economics at 
st. anne’s College, oxford. We are grateful for ideas and comments on previous 
drafts from arnim langer, as well as Jim Boyce and members of his team.
2 For discussion, see Collier and hoeffler 2004; auvinen & nafziger 1999; 
and lichbach 1989. even so, it remains important to tackle severe vertical 
inequality since it leads to high levels of poverty and is often associated with a 
higher incidence of violent crime (Bourgignon 1999).
use to mobilize followers. such mobilization is 
especially likely where there is political as well 
as economic inequality – where group leaders 
are excluded from formal political power and 
significant numbers of group members are 
economically deprived. What matters most are not 
objective inequalities but subjective perceptions 
of inequality and unfairness. 
examples of countries and regions where hIs 
appear to have been a factor in provoking violent 
conflict include Côte d’Ivoire, rwanda, northern 
Ireland, nepal, Chiapas, and sudan. The particular 
type of inequality that provokes conflict varies 
from one society to another – for example, land 
was a major issue in the conflict between whites 
and blacks in Zimbabwe, while in northern Ireland 
the conflict between protestants and Catholics 
centered more on housing and employment. note 
that it’s not only deprived groups who initiate 
conflict – richer groups may to do so too to 
preserve their privileges, as in the Biafran conflict 
in nigeria in 1967–70. 
Fiscal policies can help. Taxation is particularly 
relevant in addressing economic inequalities 
and social inequalities that have some impact on 
economic disparities. While most policies aimed at 
political inequalities lie outside the fiscal system 
(in constitutional arrangements, for example), 
decentralization of the fiscal system can empower 
local groups and thereby reduce political hIs. 
the scoPing eXercise: deFining grouPs
The first step in understanding the status and 
dynamics of horizontal inequalities in a country is 
to classify the relevant identity groups: the group 
boundaries that people perceive as important and 
on the basis of which discrimination or favoritism 
occurs. 
“evidence supports the view that 
horizontal inequalities (hIs) are often 
a source of violent conflict.”
“The first step in understanding the 
status and dynamics of horizontal 
inequalities in a country is to classify 
the relevant identity groups.”
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an initial in-depth investigation of the history and 
political economy of the country in question will 
suggest such delineations. If surveys of people’s 
own perceptions of identity distinctions are 
available, or if such a survey can be carried out, 
this can provide valuable insights. such surveys 
ask people which groups they feel are privileged 
or deprived, and which are favored or disfavored 
by the government. They can also ask about the 
importance of different aspects of identity to the 
people themselves. often, a “multiple approach,” 
which examines a variety of group classifications 
(e.g., ethnic, regional, and religious), is useful 
because it highlights the main inequalities. 
apart from defining the conflict-relevant groups, 
the scoping exercise also should address four 
questions:
a » re the salient groups ranked hierarchically 
– that is, most members of one group are 
better off than the other group(s) – or are 
they unranked, so that each group contains 
comparable fractions of rich and poor 
(horowitz 1985)?
are groups geographically concentrated, or are  »
they dispersed?
Do groups specialize in particular economic  »
activities (e.g., trading, subsistence farming, or 
cash-crop farming)?
Is the government politically inclined to  »
tackle inequalities, or does it wish to preserve 
them? For the purposes of this discussion, 
we can describe these types as “willing”  and 
“unwilling,” though in fact the situation 
may not be so clear-cut. For example, the 
government’s willingness may depend on how 
supportive aid donors are of efforts to redress 
inequalities. and there may be divisions within 
the government on this issue.
each of these questions is relevant for policy 
design.
measurement issues
While there is a voluminous literature on the 
measurement of vertical inequality, which has 
given rise to well-known measures such as the 
Gini coefficient, methods for measuring horizontal 
inequality have only begun to receive much 
attention. here we review measurement issues for 
both income and non-income dimensions of hI.
Horizontal inequality in incomes
providing summary information on horizontal 
inequality is more complex than summarizing 
vertical inequality, precisely because we are now 
concerned with groups. hI is most frequently 
represented by the comparison of  average per 
capita incomes of different groups, but this 
measure conceals distributional differences within 
those groups. 
Yet from both a political and a policy perspective, 
how groups compare at different points within 
an income distribution may be important, too. 
For example, consider the following scenarios, all 
of which are consistent with a situation in which 
Group a has a higher average income than Group B:
• Case 1: Group A outperforms Group B at every 
income level.
• Case 2: The elite (say, the top 5%) of group A 
has a higher income than the elite of group B, but 
incomes are the same across the remainder of 
their respective populations.
• Case 3: The elite and the middle class (say, top 
60%) of both groups have similar incomes, but the 
bottom 40% of group A has a significantly higher 
income than its group B counterpart.
• Case 4:  The elite of group A have a higher income 
than their counterparts in group B, but the bottom 
40% of group A have significantly lower incomes 
than the bottom 40% of group B.
“hI is most frequently represented 
by the comparison of average 
per capita incomes of different 
groups...how groups compare at 
different points within an income 
distribution may be important, too.”
Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments
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From a political perspective, in Case 1, both the 
elite and the masses of the lower-income group 
have grievances, a situation that may make 
rebellion more likely. malaysia in the 1960s and 
apartheid south africa are examples. In Case 2, 
the elite have a grievance but not the rest of the 
population, so perhaps a rebellion is less likely.3  In 
Case 3,  the income parity among the upper- and 
middle-income groups may reduce the likelihood 
of violent conflict, unless the elite feel politically 
disenfranchised or threatened, in which case they 
may find it easy to mobilize support among the 
lower-income groups. The rwandan genocide in 
1994 is an example. In Case 4, anti-elite resentments 
in group B can translate into violence against the 
poorest stratum of group a – a dynamic that has 
been seen in sri lanka. 
The differences are relevant from a policy 
perspective, too. In the first case, policies are 
needed both to increase entrepreneurial and civil-
service opportunities at the top and to provide 
basic services and economic opportunities to 
the masses. In the second case, efforts to reduce 
tensions should be focused on elites. In the third 
and fourth cases, it is a matter of improving the 
position of poorer members of the group. 
In addition to average per capita income, therefore, 
group distributional data are necessary. such data 
can be presented in two useful ways:
Compare the proportions of each group in  »
each income quantile relative to its proportion 
in the overall population. This method reveals 
by how much particular groups are over- or 
under-represented at different points in the 
income distribution.
estimate the ratios of average incomes between  »
two groups for each decile or quintile. 
3 The Calabar region in nigeria is one area where the elites of the Quas and 
efuts felt disadvantaged compared with the efiks in political appointments 
and business opportunities, but the mass population felt they were equally 
treated with respect to employment and amenities. no conflict occurred in 
Calabar, while neighboring Warri, where both elites and the general population 
perceived hIs, has experienced recurrent violent conflicts. For discussion, see 
Ukiwo 2006.
These two measures are illustrated below with 
reference to Christian-muslim disparities in the 
Indonesian province of maluku in 1995, shortly 
before religious conflict broke out there. The ratio 
of average muslim household income to average 
Christian household income in the province was 
0.91. Figure 1a shows the relative representation 
of muslims in each income decile, indicating that 
muslims were under-represented (relative to their 
share in the province’s total population) in the top 
five deciles and over-represented in the poorer 
deciles, except the very poorest decile, where they 
were slightly under-represented. Figure 1b shows 
the ratio of average incomes of the two groups 
by decile. The middle eight deciles of muslims 
were poorer than their Christian counterparts. 
But the top 10% of Muslims had somewhat higher 
average incomes than the top 10% of Christians, 
a relationship that was disguised by the fact that 
muslims were under-represented in the top decile 
of the population as a whole.
Figure 1a: 
PoPulation shares in maluku, indonesia, 1995 
 
Figure 1b: 
income ratios in maluku, indonesia, 1995 
 
source for Figures 1a and 1b: authors’ calculations from 1995 Indonesian  
Inter-Censual survey.
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Investigations of the socio-economic roots of the 
conflict in maluku have identified the erosion 
of the dominance of the Christian population 
– which had been privileged by the colonial 
regime – as a source of grievance. The tension 
issued from two particular areas:: friction between 
indigenous Christian farmers and their largely 
muslim transmigrant counterparts; and resentment 
among Christian elites about the increasing 
preference given to muslims by Jakarta (e.g., 
Brown et al. 2005). The data support that analysis: 
while Christian incomes remained around 10% 
higher than those of muslims overall, they had 
fallen below muslim incomes at the bottom and 
top ends of the distribution curve. In the end, the 
conflict engulfed many more people, but the initial 
tensions emerged precisely at those points in the 
income distribution curve.
Non-income dimensions of inequality
evidence on the dimensions of hIs unconnected 
to income is also necessary. To plan public 
expenditures, policy makers need to know where 
the main problem lies. Is it, for instance, a matter of 
inadequate access to education, or poor economic 
opportunities, or both? Does access to land or 
employment levels show the sharper inequalities, 
and which is more important to people? Data are 
often scarce in postwar settings, but certain areas 
that are fundamental to well-being should have 
priority for data collection. apart from income, 
these include land and other assets; employment; 
educational access at various levels; and health 
statistics such as infant and child mortality. 
Where the data permit, it is again desirable to 
compare performance in these non-income 
dimensions across the distribution, rather than rely 
simply on comparisons of average performance. 
Data issues
socio-economic data broken down by the relevant 
ethno-cultural categories are often sparse. 
sometimes – as, for example, in nigeria – ethno-
cultural variables are not included in surveys 
because of their political sensitivity (okolo 1999). 
For quick assessment, it may be necessary to use 
some other characteristic as a proxy for ethno-
cultural difference. Two such options are region 
and language.
regional data are often more readily available. The 
degree to which they are useful for hI assessment 
depends on the extent to which identity groups 
are geographically segregated. as a rule of thumb, 
region is a useful proxy if more than half the 
members of the relatively deprived group are 
concentrated in the targeted region while less than 
half of the privileged group are in the targeted 
region. In many african countries, ethnic and 
religious groups are regionally concentrated, so 
regional inequality may be a suitable proxy. and in 
some cases, region itself defines group identities. 
an alternative proxy is language, on which 
information sometimes is available where ethnic 
variables are not – as in Indonesian surveys in the 
new order period. Comparison of Indonesian 
language statistics at the district level with ethnic 
data that became available at a later date shows 
close correlations, suggesting that language is 
an effective proxy for ethnicity in this context 
(mancini 2005). similarly, language is often used as 
a marker for indigenous identity in latin america 
(see, for example, Beckett and pebley 2002). It is 
important to note, however, that in some contexts, 
language may not be an appropriate proxy, 
particularly where divisions are religious rather 
than ethnic – as in northern Ireland, for instance.
The first need in any country is to conduct an 
inventory of available data. potential data sources 
include:
Census data and other official surveys, such as  »
household expenditure surveys, which often 
include ethnicity or language, and sometimes 
religion.
Demographic and health surveys (Dhs), many  »
of which include ethnic identification along 
“Where the data permit, it is desirable 
to compare performance in non-income 
dimensions of hIs across the distribution.”
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with information on access to social services 
and ownership of domestic assets.
regional data from the census, household  »
surveys, and public expenditure accounts. 
specific sectoral data (e.g., from schools and  »
hospitals), which often contain ethnic and 
regional information. 
Urgent data gaps can be filled by conducting “light” 
surveys and using focus groups.4 
Proposal 1a: Where data needed to measure 
horizontal inequalities are not available (or highly 
inadequate), small-scale household surveys should 
be conducted to assess inter-group disparities in 
(a) asset ownership, (b) employment, (c) incomes, 
(d) education, and (e) health and nutrition. 
Proposal 1b: Where conflict-relevant group 
boundaries are not evident, perceptions surveys 
should be conducted on attitudes toward identities 
and inequalities. 
Proposal 1c: In addition to regional and linguistic 
categorizations, statistical offices should be 
encouraged to include ethnic, religious, or racial 
categorization (if  relevant and politically feasible) 
in subsequent data collection. 
taX Policies
Key tasks for tax policies in post-conflict settings 
are to mobilize revenue and to address inequality. 
The two are related, since perceptions of inequity 
in tax policies undermine their legitimacy, deter 
voluntary compliance, and thereby impede 
revenue mobilization. here our focus is on policies 
to redress inequality. 5
although horizontal inequalities are often defined 
in terms of religious, ethnic, or racial categories, 
it is undesirable to make tax liability dependent 
4 Fuji (2006) discusses a variety of approaches to rapid poverty mapping. 
a Core Welfare Indicator survey (CWIQ) can be designed quickly and 
inexpensively to identify access to public services from the perspective of the 
user (mcKay 2004; reinikka and svensson 2004).
5 Issues of revenue mobilization in post-conflict countries are discussed in a 
companion policy brief by michael Carnahan (2006).
on a person’s religious, ethnic, or racial identity. 
To do so would risk strengthening group divisions 
as well as violating basic principles of tax equity. 
nevertheless, tax policies can be designed to 
promote horizontal equality. This can be done 
by increasing the (vertical) progressivity of the 
tax structure and by identifying taxes that will 
bear more heavily on privileged groups than on 
deprived ones.
Increasing the progressivity of the tax structure
progressive taxation – that is, policies that tax a 
higher percentage of the incomes of the rich than 
of the poor – will usually improve hIs as well as 
reduce vertical inequality. Indeed, they will always 
do so where the groups are ranked hierarchically, 
such that for each decile the income level of the 
deprived group(s) is below that of the privileged 
group(s). This situation is fairly common – for 
example, it generally holds for indigenous groups 
in latin america.
Direct taxes on income, profits, and capital gains 
are typically the most progressive component of 
any tax system. In the immediate post-conflict 
environment, the administrative requirements of 
direct taxes often make it difficult to rely heavily 
on them. To the extent that they can be introduced, 
however, they will help to ensure progressivity in 
subsequent years.
property taxes are also usually progressive. The 
extent of the progressivity depends, of course, 
on the design of the tax and the rates charged. 
even flat rate property taxes are progressive, 
however, because poor people (groups) have 
very little property: asset inequality usually 
exceeds income inequality. a simple approach to 
improving progressivity further is to exempt all 
property below a certain value. property taxes 
“Tax policies can be designed to promote 
horizontal equality…by increasing the 
(vertical) progressivity of the tax structure 
and by identifying taxes that will bear 
more heavily on privileged groups.”
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are particularly appropriate in post-conflict 
reconstruction because government expenditure 
to maintain and build a durable peace is likely 
to generate significant returns for those holding 
property. 
Indirect taxes can also be progressive if properly 
designed. Import duties and value-added taxes can 
include exemptions for basic necessities and higher 
rates for luxury goods. specific excise duties can 
target luxuries as well. other progressive indirect 
taxes include motor-vehicle duties and taxes on 
airline flights. Fuel taxes can be differentiated so 
as to tax more heavily the sort of fuels that richer 
people use (petrol) than those poor people do 
(kerosene). 
Proposal 2: Increase the progressivity of  the tax 
system by (a) increasing the role and progressivity 
of  direct taxes and property taxes and (b) increasing 
the progressivity of  indirect taxes by raising rates 
on luxuries and exempting basic goods consumed 
by the poor.
Identifying taxes that will bear more heavily 
on privileged groups than on deprived ones
Where people live, what they produce, and 
what they consume are markers of their group 
identity. These differences make it possible to use 
tax policies to reduce hIs by differentiating on 
the basis of location, productive activities, and 
consumption behavior:
Location:   » efforts to change the regional 
balance of net revenue can improve hIs 
where groups are regionally concentrated. 
In federal states, where tax rates can be 
varied by region, the formula that determines 
central government tax rates can be designed 
to improve the situation of poorer regions. 
region-specific tax exemptions, which some 
european countries use to promote regional 
development, can do the job as well. 
Production activities: »  specialized production 
gives rise to possibilities for designing taxes 
to differentiate among groups. In Ghana, for 
example, groups that are more privileged than 
subsistence producers and northern farmers 
produce cocoa, so taxing cocoa production 
would help group distribution. In settings 
where most people in the informal sector are 
of a different ethnic group from those in the 
government and formal sector – as, for example, 
in niger (Barlow and snyder, 1993: 1187-8) – 
taxes on the formal sector will reduce hI.
Consumption behavior:  » Consumption patterns 
provide another avenue for tax differentiation. 
For example, user fees designed to fall on 
services that poorer groups use little (such as 
higher education or large-farm irrigation) can 
yield beneficial results.
Proposal 3: Design indirect taxes to bear more 
heavily on privileged groups, by introducing 
taxes or increasing rates on geographic areas and 
production and consumption activities in which 
such groups are concentrated.
although we have identified a range of tax 
policies that could assist in reducing hIs, the 
main contribution of the tax system in this 
effort is in raising the revenues with which to 
undertake hI-reducing expenditures. attention 
to the distributional incidence of taxation is also 
important, however, in order to avoid a sense 
of unfair treatment by groups. Transparency 
and fairness require public debate on tax 
policies, publicly disseminated rules, simplicity 
“property taxes are particularly 
appropriate in post-conflict 
reconstruction because government 
expenditure to maintain and 
build a durable peace is likely to 
generate significant returns for 
those holding property.”
“Transparency and fairness require 
public debate on tax policies, publicly 
disseminated rules, simplicity in 
the system, and a minimum of 
discretionary exemptions.”
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in the system, and a minimum of discretionary 
exemptions.
eXPenditure Policies
people benefit from public expenditure by three 
routes:
route 1:  Contracts and employment in  
constructing public facilities. 
route 2:  Contracts and employment in  
delivering services. 
route 3:  access to services. 
The distributional incidence of each is important. 
The first route is quantitatively significant, since 
public investment frequently accounts for three-
quarters or more of total investment in poor 
countries. The second route is also important, 
as government employment often accounts for 
over half of total formal-sector employment. and 
the third route determines who benefits from 
government services, such as health and education, 
that are important both in themselves and because 
they contribute to improved incomes. 
many analyses of the distributional impact of 
public expenditure focus only on route 3. This is 
insufficient, not only because of the quantitative 
importance of the first two routes, but because of 
their high visibility and political sensitivity.6  routes 
1 and 2 may have particularly strong effects on the 
distribution of opportunities and incomes among 
the upper-income strata of the population. 
Contracts and employment
In the allocation of contracts and employment, 
choices are limited by enterprise and skill level, 
affording little scope for changing vertical 
inequality (VI) significantly. The choice of 
technique can influence VI – for example, labor-
intensive construction techniques offer more 
jobs to low-skilled and low-income people – 
6 For example, in both Ghana and nigeria a much higher proportion of 
people believe that their ethnicity affects their chances of getting government 
jobs and contracts than access to public services (langer and Ukiwo 2006).  
but efficiency considerations tend to override 
distributional ones in the awarding of contracts 
and hiring, which may help explain why these are 
often ignored in the analysis of the distributional 
incidence of public expenditure. 
The situation is very different for horizontal 
inequality. Contracts and employment are often 
biased in their racial distribution (e.g., in south 
africa under apartheid), religious distribution (e.g., 
in northern Ireland), or ethnic distribution (e.g., 
in Kenya and sri lanka). regional location may 
also be biased. hence fairness in the distribution 
of contracts and employment in the public sector 
is crucial in formulating public policy to address 
hI.
policies to achieve greater fairness include 
competitive and transparent bidding procedures 
for contracts; ”fair” employment legislation 
and rules; and careful monitoring of allocation 
coupled with policies to counter disproportionate 
allocations, such as technical assistance to 
disadvantaged groups and, when necessary, quotas 
for contracts and government employment.
Proposal 4: In the construction of  facilities and 
delivery of  services, allocation of  contracts and 
employment should explicitly consider fairness 
among groups. Policies to promote this may include 
competitive and transparent bidding procedures 
for contracts; “fair” employment legislation and 
rules; and technical assistance and possibly quotas 
to ensure equitable distribution. 
Access to public services
Turning to the distributional impact of access to 
services, it is helpful to differentiate among five 
types of public expenditure:
• Expenditure with allocable inter-regional and 
intra-regional benefits:  most public expenditure 
benefits particular people in particular regions 
“hence fairness in the distribution 
of contracts and employment in the 
public sector is crucial in formulating 
public policy to address hI.”
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(for example, expenditure on social services 
or economic infrastructure). redirection of 
this expenditure toward deprived regions and 
groups can do much to redress both horizontal 
and vertical inequalities.7  
• Expenditure with non-allocable benefits: 
In principle, expenditure on ”pure public 
goods,” whose impacts affect the whole 
population equally, benefits poorer groups 
disproportionately in relation to their incomes. 
In practical terms, such goods are few and far 
between, so they generally cannot be relied 
upon to bring about significant redistribution.
• Expenditure with allocable benefits across 
groups but not across regions: Goods and 
services that have national benefits for people 
with particular characteristics – for example, 
subsidies for national airlines that benefit 
only those who fly, or radio broadcasts in a 
specific language benefiting only speakers of 
that language – potentially have important 
distributional impacts. ensuring that such 
expenditures are fairly distributed can be a 
significant way of improving horizontal equity.
• Expenditure with allocable benefits across 
regions but not intra-regionally: expenditures 
that benefit everyone in a particular geographic 
area (for example, expenditure to improve 
environmental quality) can contribute to 
changing hIs where groups are regionally 
concentrated. 
• Transfer payments: Transfer payments – that is, 
direct payments to communities, households, 
or individuals based on particular criteria such 
as income or age – typically are designed to 
reduce vertical inequality. They can also be 
designed to affect hI: either directly, by making 
group membership a criterion (which might 
be regarded as undesirable in some cases), or 
indirectly, by using allocation criteria that favor 
deprived groups, such as income, size of family, 
employment status, or education status.
7 regrettably, the overall record of policies toward regional development 
has not been good in terms of reducing disparities, although they may have 
prevented gaps from widening farther (shankar and shah 2003).
In federal and decentralized systems, resource 
transfers from the central government to states or 
districts can reduce inequality. nigeria, for example, 
has an equalizing element in its revenue-sharing 
formula: in one version, 30% of state allocations 
were distributed equally among the states, 40% 
according to population, 15% (inversely) with 
social development, and 5% according to local tax 
effort (ahmad and singh 2003). similarly, following 
the 2001 “Big Bang” decentralization in Indonesia, 
one-third of consolidated government expenditure 
was devolved to the districts, according to a 
formula based on expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacities; this, in theory at least, involved major 
redistribution to poorer districts.8  
In post-conflict contexts, aid frequently finances 
a very large proportion of expenditure on public 
services. Thus it is vital that aid donors, as well 
as governments, take these considerations into 
account – both in their policy dialogue with 
the government and in projects they undertake 
directly (stewart and Brown 2006). The relevant 
expenditure arenas include disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDr) and 
security sector reform (ssr), both of which are 
large in most post-conflict situations.
malaysia provides an instructive example of the 
successful use of fiscal policy to address hIs in a 
post-conflict setting.  a serious outbreak of violence 
in 1969 led to the introduction of a set of policies 
to improve hIs in the 1970s. These addressed all 
three aspects of public expenditure, and included 
not only the redirection of expenditure but also 
quotas in government employment and contracts 
to improve the position of the relatively deprived 
malays among both the elite and the masses. These 
policies successfully reduced hIs, contributing to 
a period of sustained peace.
In mozambique, in contrast, the need to correct 
hIs was not recognized during post-conflict 
reconstruction. although reconstruction has 
been successful in other respects, hIs have been 
accentuated, for government services and aid 
8 expenditure needs were determined by population, area, poverty (later 
replaced by the inverse of the human Development Index and regional per 
capita income), and costs (hofman et al. 2006).  
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distribution are strongly skewed toward the 
south. so far, however, this situation has not led to 
renewed outbreaks of violence, in part because it 
occurred in a context of overall growth in incomes 
and services (stewart 2006). 
Proposal 5: The distributional impacts of  public 
services should be monitored, and allocations 
targeted to ensure greater horizontal and vertical 
equity by targeting pro-poor sectors, activities 
within sectors, and locations. In federal or 
decentralized systems, revenue-sharing formulae 
should be designed to improve regional equity. Aid 
allocation should follow similar principles. 
Process issues 
Few policy makers have detailed information 
about the distributional incidence of public 
expenditure.9  But this is no reason to wait for 
improved information before acting. rather, it 
suggests that use should be made of whatever 
information is available, including quick surveys 
and evidence from other countries. abundant 
evidence from around the world indicates, 
for example, that the benefits from primary 
educational expenditure are more equally 
distributed than those from secondary or tertiary 
schooling. similarly, construction of trunk roads in 
relatively rich areas is likely to be regressive while 
building feeder roads in relatively poor areas is 
likely to be progressive. even with very limited 
knowledge of a particular country, enough is often 
known to improve the distributional incidence of 
public expenditure. 
Governments may lack capacity to respond to 
inequality in a post-conflict environment. Their 
capacities to monitor inequality, analyze tax 
and public expenditure incidence, and institute 
targeted programs to benefit deprived groups is 
often weak. Technical assistance to build these 
capacities is needed. 
apart from capacity constraints, governments may 
be unwilling to address inequalities for a number 
9 studies of benefit incidence in a range of countries give some guidance on 
how different types of expenditure affect VI, but not hI (see the survey by Chu 
et al., 2004). For discussion of the limitations of benefit-incidence studies, see 
mcKay (2004).  
of reasons. In some cases, political leaders and 
government officials may be unaware of the true 
extent of horizontal disparities, or they may take 
the view that generic pro-poor policies constitute 
a sufficient response to address horizontal 
inequality. In other cases, governments may be 
deliberately exclusionary. 
The case of an exclusionary government presents 
the most difficult case for external assistance actors. 
Three responses are appropriate: first, informal 
policy dialogue and formal policy conditionality 
to strengthen incentives for government efforts 
to reduce inequality; second, project and sectoral 
support directed to the deprived groups; and 
third, promotion of other objectives acceptable to 
the government that will assist the poorer groups, 
such as comprehensive education and health 
services. Because aid flows are often large relative 
to domestic revenue, donors can make a major 
contribution to overcoming inequalities in public 
expenditure.10 
Proposal 6: Aid donors should assist governments 
to identify types of  expenditure that will reduce 
inequalities, drawing on available data, light 
surveys, and evidence from other countries. Where 
capacity is a constraint, they should provide 
technical assistance to integrate distributional 
impacts into public expenditure reviews and 
planning. Where willingness to tackle inequalities 
is a constraint, they should undertake policy 
dialogue and conditionality, and direct their own 
resources to improving horizontal and vertical 
equity.
conclusions
This paper has argued that tackling inequality, 
particularly horizontal inequality, deserves an 
important place in post-conflict policies. The 
need to tackle inequalities has been recognized 
10 see stewart and Brown (2006) for further discussion of how aid can be 
used to reduce hIs.
“an exclusionary government 
presents the most difficult case 
for external assistance actors.”
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explicitly in some recent peace agreements 
– for example, in Guatemala and sudan – but 
implementation of measures to redress them has 
been problematic. at present, policies to redress 
horizontal inequalities do not form part of the 
standard development or reconstruction agendas 
of the international financial institutions and other 
external assistance providers. since aid donors play 
such an important role in post-conflict situations, 
their own acceptance and implementation of 
the need to tackle inequalities can have a major 
impact. 
an important component of policies towards 
inequality is the collection of the data needed 
to measure the nature and extent of inequalities 
and to analyze the distributive impact of the 
fiscal system. although the appropriate data are 
often not readily available, this does not present 
an insuperable problem, as enough is generally 
known, or can be rapidly collected, to identify 
appropriate policies. 
The paper has outlined a variety of ways in which 
tax and expenditure policies can affect inequality. 
For example, improving the progressivity of 
taxation will reduce vertical inequality and also 
usually reduce horizontal inequality. regional tax 
and expenditure policies can redress hI where 
deprived groups are regionally concentrated. 
Within regions, tax and expenditure can be 
designed to help deprived groups. The malaysian 
case illustrates how such policies can be effective 
in reducing horizontal inequalities.
politically, it is easier to redirect expenditure 
to deprived groups if this can be done out of 
increased total expenditure, rather than at the 
direct expense of better-off groups. at the same 
time, it is easier to mobilize increased resources 
if taxation is perceived to be equitable and if the 
“since aid donors play such an 
important role in post-conflict 
situations, their own acceptance and 
implementation of the need to tackle 
inequalities can have a major impact.”
public believes it will receive services from the 
government in return. For both reasons, the goals 
of increasing revenue and reducing inequality are 
complementary.
an appropriately designed fiscal system should be 
able to contribute substantially to the reduction 
of inequality, if this is desired by the government. 
Where it is not, it is naturally more difficult to 
implement inequality-reducing policies effectively. 
In both cases, however, aid donors have an 
important role to play. Where the government has 
the requisite political will, donors can provide 
technical assistance to build capacity to analyze 
and redress inequalities. Where political will is 
lacking, donors may not be able to change firmly 
held positions of the government in power, but they 
can draw attention to the need to monitor and take 
action to reduce inequalities, as well as help collect 
relevant data, request that public expenditure 
reviews incorporate equity considerations, and 
ensure that their own assistance contributes to 
correcting inequalities. 
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